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Abstract
A number of organizations publish microdata for pur-
poses such as public health and demographic research.
Although attributes of microdata that clearly iden-
tify individuals, such as name and medical care card
number, are generally removed, these databases can
sometimes be joined with other public databases on
attributes such as Zip code, Gender and Age to re-
identify individuals who were supposed to remain
anonymous. “Linking” attacks are made easier by the
availability of other complementary databases over
the Internet.
k-anonymity is a technique that prevents “link-
ing” attacks by generalizing and/or suppressing por-
tions of the released microdata so that no individual
can be uniquely distinguished from a group of size k.
In this paper, we investigate a practical model of k-
anonymity, called full-domain generalization. We ex-
amine the issue of computing minimal k-anonymous
table based on the definition of minimality described
by Samarati. We introduce the hash-based technique
previously used in mining associate rules and present
an efficient hash-based algorithm to find the minimal
k-anonymous table, which improves the previous bi-
nary search algorithm first proposed by Samarati.
Keywords: microdata release, hash-based algorithm,
k-anonymity.
1 Introduction
Several microdata1 disclosure protection techniques
have been developed in the context of statistical
database, such as scrambling and swapping values
and adding noise to the data while maintaining an
overall statistical integrity of the result (Adam &
Wortman 1989, Willenborg & DeWaal 1996). How-
ever, many applications require release and explicit
management of microdata while maintaining truthful
information within each tuple. This ‘data quality’ re-
quirement makes inappropriate those techniques that
disturb data and therefore, although preserving sta-
tistical properties, compromise the correctness of the
single pieces of information. Among the techniques
proposed for providing anonymity in the release of mi-
crodata (Federal Committee on Statistical Methodol-
ogy 1994) we focus on two techniques in particular:
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1The term “microdata” refers to data published in raw, non-
aggregated form (Willenborg & DeWaal 2001).
generalization and suppression (in the Statistics liter-
ature, this approach is often called recording), which
unlike other existing techniques, such as scrambling
or swapping, preserve the truthfulness of the informa-
tion.
k-anonymity is a technique that prevents joining
attacks by generalizing and/or suppressing portions of
the released microdata so that no individual can be
uniquely distinguished from a group of size k. There
are a number of models for producing an anonymous
table. One class of models, called global-recoding
(Willenborg & DeWaal 2001), map the values in the
domains of quasi-identifier attributes (defined in Sec-
tion 2) to other values. This paper is primarily con-
cerned with a specific global-recoding model, called
full-domain generalization. Full-domain generaliza-
tion was proposed by Samarati and Sweeney (Sama-
rati & Sweeney 1998, Samarati 2001) and maps the
entire domain of each quasi-identifier attribute in a
table to a more general domain in its domain gener-
alization hierarchy. This scheme guarantees that all
values of a particular attribute in the anonymous ta-
ble belong to the same domain.
For any anonymity mechanism, it is desirable to
define some notion of minimality. Intuitively, a k-
anonymous table should not generalize, suppress, or
distort the data more than is necessary to achieve
such k-anonymity. Indeed, there are a number of ways
to define minimality. One notion of minimality is de-
fined as to generalize or suppress the minimum num-
ber of attribute values in order to satisfy a given k-
anonymity requirement. Such a problem is NP -hard
(Aggarwal et al. 2005, Meyerson & Williams 2004).
As to our model, the notion of minimal full-domain
generalization was defined in (Samarati & Sweeney
1998, Samarati 2001) using the distance vector of
the domain generalization. Informally, this definition
says that a full-domain generalized private table (PT )
is minimal if PT is k-anonymous, and the height of
the resulting generalization is less than or equal to
that of any other k-anonymous full-domain general-
ization.
In this paper, we focus on this specific global-
recoding model of k-anonymity. Our objective is to
find the minimal k-anonymous generalization (table)
under the definition of minimality defined by Sama-
rati (Samarati 2001). By introducing the hash-based
technique, we provide a new approach to generate
minimal k-anonymous tables that not only improves
the search algorithm proposed by Samarati (Samarati
2001) but is also useful for computing other optimal
criteria for k-anonymity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we introduce some notions of k-
anonymous table. In Section 3, we introduce our hash
technique used in this paper. In Section 4, we intro-
duce the generalization relationship and the definition
of minimal k-anonymous table. Our core hash-based
Gender Age Zip Other Attributes Diseases
Male 25 4370 · · · · · · Hypertension
Male 25 4370 · · · · · · Hypertension
Male 22 4352 · · · · · · Depression
Female 28 4373 · · · · · · Chest Pain
Female 28 4373 · · · · · · Obesity
Female 34 4350 · · · · · · Flu
Table 1: Released microdata
Bucket 0 1 2 3
Contents (22,4352) (25, 4370) (34, 4350) (28, 4373)
(25, 4370) (28, 4373)
Table 2: Hashed table 1 with QI = {Age, Zip}
Bucket 0 1 2 3
COUNT 1 2 1 2
Contents (22,4352) (25, 4370) (34, 4350) (28, 4373)
(25, 4370) (28, 4373)
Table 3: Hash table with COUNT
algorithm and comparisons with previous algorithm
discussed in Section 5. Related work is discussed in
Section 6. Conclusion and future work are drawn in
Section 7.
2 k-anonymous private table
The concept of k-anonymity (Samarati & Sweeney
1998) tries to capture one of the main requirements
that has been followed by the statistical community
and by agencies releasing data on the private table
(PT ). According to the requirement, the released
data should be indistinguishably related to no less
than a certain number of respondents. The set of
attributes included in the private table, also exter-
nally available and therefore exploitable for linking,
is called quasi-identifier (QI). The requirement just
stated is then translated into the k-anonymity re-
quirement below, which states that every tuple re-
leased cannot be related to fewer than k respondents.
Definition 1 (k-anonymous requirement): Each
release of data must be such that every combination of
values of quasi-identifiers can be indistinctly matched
to at least k respondents.
Since it seems impossible or highly impractical to
make assumptions on the datasets available for link-
ing to external attackers or curious data recipients,
essentially k-anonymity takes a safe approach requir-
ing that the respondents should be indistinguishable
(within a given set) with respect to the set of at-
tributes in the released table. To guarantee the k-
anonymity requirement, k-anonymity requires each
value of a quasi-identifier in the released table to have
at least k occurrences. Formally, we have the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 2 (k-anonymity): Let PT (A1, · · · , Am)
be a private table and QI be a quasi-identifier as-
sociated with it. PT is said to satisfy k-anonymity
with respect to QI if and only if each sequence of val-
ues in PT [QI] appears at least with k occurrences in
PT [QI]2.
If a set of attributes of external tables appears in
the quasi-identifier associated with the private table
(PT ) and the table satisfies k-anonymity, then the
combination of the released data with the external
data will never allow the recipient to associate each
released tuple with less than k respondents. For in-
stance, consider the released microdata in Table 1
with quasi-identifier QI = {Gender, Age, Zip}, we
see that the table satisfies k-anonymous with k = 1
only since there exists single occurrence of values
over the considered QI (e.g., the single occurrence
of “Male, 22 and 4352”).
2PT [QI] denotes the projection, maintaining duplicate tuples,
of attributes QI in PT .
3 Hash table
A hash table is a data structure that will increase
the search efficiency from O(log(n)) (binary search)
to O(1) (constant time) (Cormen et al. 2001). A hash
table is made up of two parts: an array (the actual
table where the data to be searched is stored) and
a mapping function, known as a hash function. The
hash function is a mapping from the input data space
to the integer space that defines the indices of the
array (bucket). In other words, the hash function
provides a way for assigning numbers to the input
data such that the data can then be stored at the
array (bucket) with the index corresponding to the
assigned number. For example, the data in Table 1
are mapped into buckets labeled 0, 1, 2, 3 in Table 2.
The data in the bucket with the same assigned num-
ber is called a hash equivalence class. Depending on
the different problems, we could choose different hash
functions to classify our input data as we need. For
instance, consider quasi-identifier QI = {Age, Zip}
in Table 1. We hash them into different buckets with
the function ((Age− 20) + (Zip− 4350)) mod 4 (see
Table 2).
From Table 2 we see that two identical data (25,
4350) and (28, 4353) in the quasi-identifier fall into
two different hash equivalence classes. Further, if we
add a row (labeled COUNT) to record the number
of contents in the corresponding bucket (see Table
3), we can easily determine whether or not the table
satisfies the k-anonymity requirement. For instance,
according to the row COUNT in Table 3, Table 1 only
satisfies k-anonymity with k = 1.
This hash-based technique is not new in data min-
ing. In (Park et al. 1995), the authors used this
technique to present an efficient hash-based algorithm
for mining association rules which improves previous
well-known A priori algorithm. In this paper, we in-
tegrate this technique into computation of minimal
k-anonymous table. By using such a technique, we
can reduce the number of potential sets that need to
be checked whether they are k-anonymous during bi-
nary search and thus improve the time complexity in
(Samarati 2001)
Concerning the efficiency of hash table and binary
search, we note the following. (1) Hash table has a
faster average lookup time O(1) (Cormen et al. 2001)
3 than the binary search algorithm O(log(n)). Hash
3Note that the worst case in hash tables happens when every
data element are hashed to the same value due to some bad luck
in choosing the hash function and bad programming. In that case,
to do a lookup, we would really be doing a straight linear search
on a linked list, which means that our search operation is back to
being O(n). The worst case search time for a hash table is O(n).
However, the probability of that happening is so small that, while
the worst case search time is O(n), both the best and average cases
are O(1).
table shines in very large arrays, where O(1) perfor-
mance is important. (2) Building a hash table re-
quires a reasonable hash function, which sometimes
can be difficult to write well, while binary search re-
quires a total ordering on the input data. On the
other hand, with hash tables the data may be only
partially ordered.
4 Data generalization
4.1 Generalization relationship
Among the techniques proposed for providing
anonymity in the release of microdata, the k-
anonymity proposal focuses on two techniques in par-
ticular: generalization and suppression, which unlike
other existing techniques, such as scrambling or swap-
ping, preserve the truthfulness of the information.
Generalization consists in substituting the values
of a given attribute with more general values. We use
∗ to denote the more general value. For instance, we
could generalize two different Zip code 4370 and 4373
to 437∗. The other technique, referred to as data sup-
pression, removes the part or entire value of attributes
from the table. Since suppressing an attribute (i.e.,
not releasing any of its values) to reach k-anonymity
can equivalently be modeled via a generalization of
all the attribute values to the most generalized data
∗4, we consider only data generalization.
The notion of domain (i.e., the set of values that
an attribute can assume) is extended to capture the
generalization process by assuming the existence of
a set of generalized domains. The set of original do-
mains together with their generalizations is referred
to as Dom. Each generalized domain contains gen-
eralized values and there exists a mapping between
each domain and its generalizations. (For example,
Zip codes can be generalized by dropping the least
significant digit at each generalization step, Ages can
be generalized to an interval, and so on). This map-
ping is described by means of a generalization rela-
tionship ≤D. Given two domains Di and Dj ∈ Dom,
Di ≤D Dj states that values in domain Dj are gen-
eralizations of values in Di. The generalization rela-
tionship ≤D defines a partial order on the set Dom of
domains, and is required to satisfy the following two
conditions:
C1: ∀Di, Dj , Dz ∈ Dom:
Di ≤D Dj , Di ≤D Dz ⇒ Dj ≤D Dz ∨Dz ≤D Dj
C2: all maximal element of Dom are singleton.
Condition C1 states that for each domain Di, the
set of domains generalization of Di is totally ordered
and we can think of the whole generalization domain
as a chain of nodes, and if there is an edge from Di to
Dj , we call Dj the direct generalization of Di. Note
that the generalization relationship ≤D is transitive,
and thus, if Di ≤ Dj and Dj ≤ Dk, then Di ≤ Dk.
In this case, we call Dk the implied generalization of
Di. Condition C1 implies that each Di has at most
one direct generalization domain Dj , thus ensuring
determinism in the generalization process. Condi-
tion C2 ensures that all values in each domain can
be generalized to a single value. For each domain
D ∈ Dom, the definition of a generalization relation-
ship implies the existence of a totally ordered hierar-
chy, called the domain generalization hierarchy, de-
noted DGHD. Pathes in the domain generalization
hierarchy correspond to implied generalizations and
4Note that this observation holds assuming that attribute sup-
pression removes only the values and not the attribute (column)
itself. This assumption is reasonable since removal of the attribute
(column) is not needed for k-anonymity.
Z1 = {435∗, 437∗}
Z0 = {4350, 4352, 4370, 4373}
Z2 = {43 ∗ ∗}
DGHZ0
person
437∗
4370 43734352
435∗
43 ∗ ∗
V GHZ0
G0 = {male, female}
G1 = {person}
DGHG0
female
4350
male
V GHG0
A0 = {22, 25, 28, 34}
A1 = {(22− 25), (28− 34))}
A2 = {(22− 34)}
DGHA0
22 25 28 34
(22-25) (28-34)
(22-34)
V GHA0
Figure 1: Domain and value generalization hierarchies for Zip, Age
and Gender
edges correspond to direct generalizations. For exam-
ple, consider DGHZ0 in Figure 1. Z1 is the direct
generalization of Z0 and Z2 is the implied generaliza-
tion of Z0.
A value generalization relationship denoted ≤V ,
can also be defined, which associates with each value
in domain Di a unique value in domain Dj . For each
domain D ∈ Dom, the value generalization relation-
ship implies the existence of a value generalization
hierarchy, denoted V GHD. It is easy to see that the
value generalization hierarchy V GHD is a tree, where
the leaves are the minimal values in D and the root
(i.e., the most general value) is the value of the max-
imum element in DGHD.
EXAMPLE: Figure 1 illustrates an example of do-
main and value generalization hierarchies for do-
mains: Z0, A0 and G0. Z0 represents a subset of
the Zip codes in Table 1; A0 represents Age; and
G0 represents Gender. The generalization relation-
ship specified for Zip codes generalizes a 4-digit Zip
code, first to a 3-digit Zip code, and then to a 2-digit
Zip code. The attribute Age is first generalized to
the interval (22-25) and (28-34), then to the inter-
val (22-34). The Gender hierarchy in the figure is of
immediate interpretation.
Since the approach in (Samarati 2001) works on
sets of attributes, the generalization relationship and
hierarchies are extended to refer to tuples composed
of elements of Dom or of their values. Given a do-
main tuple DT =< D1, · · · , Dn > such that Di ∈
Dom, i = 1, · · · , n, the domain generalization hierar-
chy of DT is DGHDT = DGHD1 × · · · × DGHDn ,
where the Cartesian product is ordered by impos-
ing coordinate-wise order. Since each DGHDi is to-
tally ordered, DGHDT defines a lattice with DT as
its minimal element and the tuple composed of the
top of each DGHDi , i = 1, · · · , n as its maximal
element. Each path from DT to the unique maxi-
mal element of DGHDT defines a possible alterna-
tive path, called generalization strategy for DGHDT ,
which can be followed when generalizing a quasi-
identifierQI = (A1, · · · , An) of attributes on domains
D1, · · · , Dn. In correspondence with each generaliza-
tion strategy of a domain tuple, there is a value gener-
alization strategy describing the generalization at the
value level. Such a generalization strategy hierarchy
is actually a tree structure. The top unique maximal
element can be regarded as the root of the tree and
the minimal element on the bottom is the leaf of the
tree. Let L[i, j] denote the jth data at height i (The
bottom data is at the height 0) and L[i] denote the
number of data at the height i.
EXAMPLE: Consider domains G0 (Gender) and
Z0 (Zip code) whose generalization hierarchies are
illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 illustrates the do-
main generalization hierarchy of the domain tuple
< G0, Z0 > together with the corresponding do-
G0 Z0
Male 4370
Male 4370
Male 4352
Female 4373
Female 4373
Female 4350
Fig 3. 1: PT
G0 Z2
Male 43∗∗
Male 43∗∗
Male 43∗∗
Female 43∗∗
Female 43∗∗
Female 43∗∗
Fig 3. 2: GT[0,2]
G1 Z1
person 437∗
person 437∗
person 435∗
person 437∗
person 437∗
person 435∗
Fig 3. 3: GT[1,1]
G1 Z2
person 43∗∗
person 43∗∗
person 43∗∗
person 43∗∗
person 43∗∗
person 43∗∗
Fig 3. 4: GT[1,2]
Figure 3: Generalized table for PT
< G0, Z0 >
< G0, Z1 >
< G0, Z2 >
< G1, Z2 >
< G1, Z1 >
< G1, Z0 >
DGH<G0,Z0>
(female, 4373) (male, 4352) (female, 4350)(male, 4370)
(person, 4370) (person, 4373) (person, 4352) (person, 4350)
(person, 437∗) (person, 435∗)
(person, 43∗∗)
< G1, Z1 >
< G1, Z2 >
< G0, Z0 >
< G1, Z0 >
Generalization Strategy 1
(female, 4373)(male, 4370)
(female, 4373) (male, 4352) (female, 4350)(male, 4370)
(male, 437∗) (female, 437∗) (male, 435∗) (female, 435∗)
(person, 437∗) (person, 435∗)
(person, 43∗∗)
< G1, Z1 >
< G1, Z2 >
< G0, Z0 >
< G0, Z1 >
Generalization Strategy 2
(female, 4373)(male, 4370)
(female, 4373)(male, 4352) (female, 4350)(male, 4370)
(male, 437∗) (female, 437∗)(male, 435∗) (female, 435∗)
(male, 43∗∗) (female, 43∗∗)
(person, 43∗∗)
< G0, Z2 >
< G1, Z2 >
< G0, Z0 >
< G0, Z1 >
Generalization Strategy 3
(female, 4373)(male, 4370)
Figure 2: Hierarchy DGH<G0,Z0> and corresponding domain and
value generalization strategies
main and value generalization strategies. There are
three different generalization strategies corresponding
to the three paths from the bottom to the top element
of lattice DGH<G0,Z0>. In the generalization strat-
egy 1, L[0, 2] is (male, 4370), L[0] = 6 and L[2, 2] is
(person, 435∗), L[2] = 2.
4.2 Generalized table and minimal general-
ization
Given a private table (PT ), our approach to provide
k-anonymity is to generalize the values stored in the
table. Intuitively, attribute values stored in the pri-
vate table (PT ) can be substituted with generalized
values upon release. Since multiple values can be
mapped to a single generalized value, generalization
may decrease the number of distinct tuples, thereby
possibly increasing the size of the clusters containing
tuples with the same values. We perform generaliza-
tion at the attribute level. Generalizing an attribute
means substituting its values with corresponding val-
ues from a more general domain. Generalization at
the attribute level ensures that all values of an at-
tribute belong to the same domain. In the following,
dom(Ai, PT ) denotes the domain of attribute Ai in
private table PT .
Definition 3 (Generalized table): Let
PTi(A1, · · · , An) and PTj(A1, · · · , An) be two tables
defined in the same set of attributes. PTj is said to
be a generalization of PTi, written PTi ¹ PTj , if and
only if: (1) |PTi| = |PTj |; (2) ∀Az ∈ {A1, · · · , An} :
dom(Az, PTi) ≤D dom(Az, PTj); and (3) It is
possible to define a bijective mapping between PTi
and PTj that associates each tuple pti ∈ PTi with a
tuple ptj ∈ PTj such that pti[Az] ≤V ptj [Az] for all
Az ∈ {A1, · · · , An}.
EXAMPLE: Consider the private table PT illus-
trated in Figure 3.1 and the domain and value gener-
alization hierarchies for G0(Gender) and Z0(Zip) il-
lustrated in Figure 2. Assume QI = {Gender, Zip}
to be a quasi-identifier. The following three tables
in Figure 3 are all possible generalized tables for PT .
For the clarity, each table reports the domain for each
attribute in the table. With respect to k-anonymity,
GT[1,1] satisfies k-anonymity for k = 1, 2; GT[0,2] sat-
isfies k-anonymity for k = 1, 2, 3 and GT[1,2] satisfies
k-anonymity for k = 1, · · · , 6.
Given a private table PT , different possible gen-
eralizations exist. However, not all generalizations
can be considered equally satisfactory. For instance,
the trivial generalization bringing each attribute to
the highest possible level of generalization provides
k-anonymity at the price of a strong generalization of
the data. Such extreme generalization is not needed
if a table containing more specific values exists which
satisfies k-anonymity as well. This concept is cap-
tured by the definition of minimal k-anonymity (gen-
eralization). To introduce it we first introduce the
notion of distance vector. 5
Definition 4 (Distance vector): Let
PTi(A1, · · · , An) and PTj(A1, · · · , An) be two
tables such that PTi ¹ PTj . The distance vector
of PTj from PTi is the vector DVi,j = [d1, · · · , dn]
where each dz, z = 1, · · · , n, is the length of the
unique path between Dz = dom(Az, PTi) and
dom(Az, PTj) in the domain generalization hierarchy
DGHDz .
EXAMPLE: Consider the private table PT and its
generalizations illustrated in Figure 3. The distance
vectors between PT and each of its generalized ta-
bles is the vector appearing as a subscript of the ta-
ble. A generalization hierarchy for a domain tuple
can be seen as a hierarchy (lattice) on the correspond-
ing distance vectors. Figure 4 illustrates the lattice
5In (LeFevre et al. 2005) the star scheme is used for large
databases. Here, we use distance vector to define minimal k-
anonymity.
Bucket 0 1 2
Children[i, j] 0 1 ≥ 2
Contents L[0, 1], L[0, 2], L[0, 3] L[1, 3] L[1, 1], L[1, 2]
L[0, 4], L[0, 5], L[0, 6] L[1, 4] L[2, 1], L[2, 2], L[3, 1]
Table 4: Hash table of Generalization Strategy 1 in Figure 2
Algorithm 1: Finding minimal solution in k-anonymous class.
Input: the k-anonymous class
1. Sort the data in k-anonymous class.
2. Compute the number n(i) of L[i, j] at each height i;
3. If n(i) 6= L[i], discard the all the L[i, j] at the height i.
4. Otherwise, keep them.
Output: The height at which the first data is in the remaining
k-anonymous class, and generalize the data to this height could
obtain the minimal k-anonymous table.
Algorithm 2: Hash-based algorithm for minimal k-anonymity.
Input: Generalization hierarchy and anonymous requirement k
Output: A minimal k-anonymous table.
1. Create a table with k + 1 column labeling 0, 1, · · · , k − 1, k.
Compute Children[i, j] for each data j at the height i.
2. For l = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1
if Children[i, j] = l, put Children[i, j] to the bucket labeled l.
else put Children[i, j] to the bucket labeled k.
3. Compute the minimal k-anonymous table by Algorithm 1.
< G0, Z0 >
< G0, Z1 >
< G0, Z2 >
[1, 2]
< G1, Z1 >
< G1, Z0 >
DGH<G0,Z0>
< G1, Z2 >
[1, 1] [0, 2]
[1, 0] [0, 1]
[0, 0]
Figure 4: Hierarchy DGH<G0,Z0> and corresponding lattice on
distance vectors
representing the dominance relationship between the
distance vectors corresponding to the possible gener-
alizations of < G0, Z0 >.
We extend the dominance relationship ≤D on in-
tegers to distance vectors by requiring coordinate-
wise ordering as follows. Given two distance vec-
tors DV = [d1, · · · , dn] and DV ′ = [d′1, · · · , d′n],
DV ≤ DV ′ if and only if di ≤ d′i for all i = 1, · · · , n.
Moreover, DV < DV ′ if and only if DV ≤ DV ′ and
DV 6= DV ′.
Intuitively, a generalization PTi(A1, · · · , An) is
minimal k-anonymity (generalization) if and only
if there does not exist another generalization
PTz(A1, · · · , An) satisfying k-anonymity and whose
domain tuple is dominated by PTj in the correspond-
ing lattice of distance vectors. Formally, we can define
it as follows:
Definition 5 (Minimal k-anonymity): Let
PTi(A1, · · · , An) and PTj(A1, · · · , An) be two tables
such that PTi ¹ PTj . PTj is said to be a minimal
k-anonymity (generalization) of PTi if and only if:
(1) PTj satisfies k-anonymity; and (2) ∀PTz : PTi ¹
PTz, PTz satisfies k-anonymity⇒ ¬(DVi,z ≤ DVi,j).
EXAMPLE: Consider table PT and its generalized
tables illustrated in Figure 3. For k = 2 two minimal
k-anonymous table exist, namely GT[0,2] and GT[1,1].
GT[1,2] is not minimal because it is a generation of
GT[1,1] and GT[0,2]. Also, there is only one minimal
k-generalized tables with k = 3, which is GT[0,2].
5 Hash-based algorithm
A number of convincing parallels exist between Sama-
rati and Sweeney’s generalization framework (Sama-
rati & Sweeney 1998, Samarati 2001) and ideas used
in mining association rules (Agrawal & Srikant 1994,
Srikant & Agrawal 1995) and the hash-based tech-
nique used in (Park et al. 1995). By bringing these
techniques to bear on our model of full-domain gener-
alization problem, we develop an efficient hash-based
algorithm for computing k-minimal anonymity.
In (Samarati 2001), Samarati describes an algo-
rithm for finding a single minimal k-anonymous full-
domain generalization based on the specific definition
of minimality outlined in the previous section. The al-
gorithm uses the observation that if no generalization
of height h satisfies k-anonymity, then no generaliza-
tion of height h′ < h will satisfy k-anonymity. For this
reason, the algorithm performs a binary search on the
height value. If the maximum height in the general-
ization lattice is h, the algorithm begins by checking
each generalization at height bh2 c. If a generaliza-
tion exists at this height that satisfies k-anonymity,
the search proceeds to look at the generalizations of
height bh4 c. Otherwise, generalizations of height b 3h4 c
are searched, and so forth. This algorithm is proven
to find a single minimal k-anonymous table.
We integrate the hash technique into the algorithm
and develop a more efficient algorithm based on our
definition of minimality (Definition 5). A drawback
of Samarati’s algorithm is that for arbitrary defini-
tions of minimality this binary search algorithm is not
always guaranteed to find the minimal k-anonymity
table. We conjecture that the hash technique used in
this paper might be suitable for the further improve-
ment of algorithms based on other optimal criteria for
k-anonymity.
Let the domain generalization hierarchy be
DGHDT , where DT is the tuples of the domains of
the quasi-identifier. Assume that the top generaliza-
tion data with the highest height in DGHDT satisfies
the required k-anonymity. The idea of the algorithm
is to hash the data in DGHDT to a different hash
equivalence class. Under our definition of the mini-
mality, the hash function that we choose should hash
all generalizations with height h > 0 in DGHDT that
satisfies k-anonymity to the same hash equivalence
class, which is called the k-anonymous class. (The
bucket labeled 2 in Table 4). The hash-based algo-
rithm consists of two main steps. At the first stage,
the data that satisfies k-anonymity are hashed into
the k-anonymous class. The second step is to use Al-
gorithm 1 to find the minimal k-anonymous table in
the k-anonymous class.
Algorithm 1 illustrate how to find the minimal
k-anonymous table in k-anonymous class. Con-
sider Table 1 and its Generalization Strategy 1 in
Figure 2. Generalized data L[1, 1], L[1, 2], L[2, 1],
L[2, 2] and L[3, 1] are hashed into the k-anonymous
class. We sort the data in k-anonymous class as
{L[1, 1], L[1, 2], L[2, 1], L[2, 2], L[3, 1]}. Since L[1] =
4 and the number of data at the height 1 in k-
anonymous class is 2. According to Step 3 in Al-
gorithm 1, we delete L[1, 1] and L[1, 2] from k-
anonymous class. At last, the output height is 2, and
we could generalize the table to this height so that
it satisfies 2-anonymity with quasi-identifier QI =
{Gender, Zip}.
Next, we illustrate how to hash the generalization
data in DGHDT to the k-anonymous class. Denote
Children[i, j] the number of children that the jth
data at the height i have. For example, in Gener-
alization Strategy 1 in Figure 2, Children[1, 3] = 1
and Children[2, 1] = 4. Suppose we have the require-
ment of k-anonymity. The desired hash table con-
tains k+1 buckets, labeled as 0, 1, 2, · · · , k−1, k, the
labeled number 0, 1, · · · , k − 1 denotes the value of
Children[i, j] in DGHDT and the kth bucket has the
data whose Children[i, j] ≥ k. Note that the bucket
labeled k is actually the k-anonymous class. We
could see the following Table 4 as an example(where
k = 2). All the potential generalization data satisfy-
ing 2-anonymity are classified into the third bucket,
which consists of the k-anonymous class.
Algorithm 2 is our hash-based algorithm. Com-
pared to Samarati’s binary search algorithm, Algo-
rithm 2 finds the minimal k-anonymous table in the k-
anonymous class, which is smaller than the potential
sets that need to be checked in Samarati’s algorithm.
Because of the hash technique we used in Algorithm
2, the search complexity is reduced from O(log(n))
(binary search) to O(1) (Cormen et al. 2001).
6 Related work
Protecting anonymity when publishing microdata has
long been recognized as a problem (Willenborg & De-
Waal 2001), and there has been much recent work
on computing k-anonymity for this purpose. The µ-
Argus system (Hundepool & Willenborg 1996) was
implemented to anonymize microdata but consid-
ered attribute combinations of only a limited size,
so the results were not always guaranteed to be k-
anonymous.
In recent years, numerous algorithms have been
proposed for implementing k-anonymity via general-
ization and suppression. The framework was origi-
nally defined by Samarati and Sweeney (Samarati &
Sweeney 1998). Sweeney proposed a greedy heuristic
algorithm for full-domain generalization (“Datafly”)
(Sweeney 2002). Although the resulting generaliza-
tion is guaranteed to be k-anonymous, there are no
minimality guarantees. Samarati proposed the binary
search algorithm for discovering a single minimal full-
domain generalization that is described in Section 5.
LeFevre et al. described an efficient search algorithm
called Incognito, for anonymous full-domain general-
ization (LeFevre et al. 2005).
Cost metrics intended to quantify loss of informa-
tion due to generalization were described in (Iyen-
gar 2002). Given such a cost metric, Iyengar (Iyen-
gar 2002) developed a genetic algorithm and Win-
kler (Winkler 2002) described a stochastic algorithm
based on simulated annealing to find locally min-
imal anonymous table. Recently, top-down (Fung
et al. 2005) and bottom-up (Wang, Yu & Chakraborty
2004) greedy heuristic algorithms were proposed to
produce anonymous data.
Bayardo and Agrawal (Bayardo & Agrawal 2005)
described a set enumeration approach to find an opti-
mal anonymous table according to a given cost met-
ric. Subsequent work shows that optimal anonymity
under this model may not be as good as anonymity
produced with a multi- dimension variation (LeFevre
et al. 2005). Finally, Meyerson and Williams (Mey-
erson & Williams 2004) and Aggarwal et al. (Ag-
garwal et al. 2005) proved the optimal k-anonymity
is NP -hard (based on the number of cells and num-
ber of attributes that are generalized and suppressed)
and describe approximation algorithms for optimal k-
anonymity.
In addition to generalization and suppression, re-
lated techniques based on clustering have also been
proposed in the literature. Microaggregation first
clusters data into (ideally homogeneous) groups of
required minimal occupancy and then publishes the
centroid of each group (Domingo-Ferrer & Mateo-
Sanz 2002). Similarly, Aggarwal et al. propose clus-
tering data into groups of at least size k and then
publish various summary statistics for each cluster
(Aggarwal et al. 2006).
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we focus on a specific global-recoding
model of k-anonymity. Our objective is to find
the minimal k-anonymous generalization (table) un-
der the definition of minimality defined by Samarati
(Samarati 2001). By introducing the hash-based tech-
nique, we provide a new approach to generate mini-
mal k-anonymous table, which not only improves pre-
vious search algorithm proposed by Samarati (Sama-
rati 2001), but might be useful for computing other
optimal criteria solution for k-anonymity.
In future work, we conjecture this hash-based tech-
nique might be suitable for further improvement of
the Incognito (LeFevre et al. 2005) for full-domain
generalization, since it might significantly reduce the
number of 2-attribute candidate sets. The technique
might also apply in multilevel generalization. For
many applications, it is difficult to find required k-
anonymity tables at low or primitive levels of the
generalization hierarchy due to the sparsity of data
in multidimensional space. k-anonymous table gen-
erated at very high levels in the generalization hier-
archy might be suitable for some attributes, however,
to some extent, it may be too generalized in some
attributes. Therefore, data mining system should
provide capability to generate k-anonymous tables
at multiple levels of the generalization hierarchy and
traverse easily among different generalization levels.
The hash-based technique may provide a new point
of view and a more efficient way to make multilevel
k-anonymous tables.
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